SEVENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL

Discussion in Case: SEC v. Jarkesy

Docket Number: 22-859

Date Argued: 11/29/23

JUSTICE GORSUCH: So, Mr. Fletcher, with respect to your argument that Congress can move something from courts into agencies and the Seventh Amendment doesn't speak to that because it's not a suit, I think Noel Webster described a suit as any action or process for the recovery of a right or a claim before any tribunal, which would seem to be a problem. That's a pretty contemporaneous definition. And then Justice Brennan in Granfinanciera I think addressed your argument pretty squarely when he said Congress cannot eliminate a party's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial merely by relabeling the cause of action and placing jurisdiction in an administrative agency. Thoughts?

MR. FLETCHER: Yeah. So I -- I guess I think that's still inconsistent with what the Court has said in Granfinanciera.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I just quoted from Granfinanciera.

MR. FLETCHER: I -- I'm sorry. I -- I misspoke. I don't think that's what the Court held in Granfinanciera. It's inconsistent with what the Court said.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: Are you saying I misread it, Mr. Fletcher?

MR. FLETCHER: No, Justice Gorsuch. I'm saying --

JUSTICE GORSUCH: You said -- you said that that's a purely taxonomic change.

MR. FLETCHER: Yes.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: And that that's not enough to render it no longer a suit for purposes of the Seventh Amendment, right?

MR. FLETCHER: Yes. I think, in context, Granfinanciera is talking about a proceeding that was in a bankruptcy court in the Article III setting. I think the Court's subsequent cases, including Oil States, have Heritage Reporting Corporation said, if you're permissibly in an Article III tribunal, then the Seventh Amendment doesn't have independent work to do. I apologize for misidentifying the case I was relying on.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: All right. But it -- it would seem strange. And we don't usually say the government can avoid a constitutional mandate merely by relabeling or moving things around. It's -- it's as much a violation to do something indirectly as it is directly we usually say, right?

Maxim: Maxim of Law 4b. He who does a thing by another is considered as doing it himself [i.e., the acts of an agent are the acts of the principal.] Broom, Max. 817, 818, et seq.; A Collection Maxims of Law by Charles A. Weisman

Please take notice that as agency workers, state judges, presiding judges, state legislators, etc. that you are bound by the Constitutions that you have all sworn to uphold, and from this time forward please be advised that taking children, cars, houses, weapons, rights, property, etc. without a trial by jury in a court of record following the course of the common law is unlawful. Please also take further notice that attorneys, who don't have their name on the line, as they are not in positions of service and contract with the people, presenting you with the idea that it's acceptable to trample the people's rights by device or artifice does not in any way remove your responsibility for your wrongdoings. Furthermore, there is another element of wrong being committed when you are working in a federal program and make money outside of your normal salary for carrying out the functions of that program, leaving one with unclean hands, on top of taking property or rights from the people without right! All past cases that bypassed the common law are unlawful. Therefore, it is my immediate demand, wish, and order that you restore all that has been unlawfully taken without constitutionally mandated due process, and notify all those who were harmed, or you agree that any wrong that is done in this regard in the future, or that has not been corrected from past trespasses, is done purposely, with full knowledge, intent and malice, and will be recognized as such by the People, whom you swore to serve and protect. This notice is sent to you in the peace and love of Jesus Christ, that you may repent and do works worthy of the same.

Maxim: "Judicial notice is a form of evidence."

Mann v Mann, 172 P. 2d 369, 375, 76 Cal. App. 2d 32.